

REMAKING PLANNING

THE POLITICS
OF URBAN CHANGE
IN THE THATCHER
YEARS

TIM BRINDLEY,
YVONNE RYDIN
& GERRY STOKER



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THE POLITICS OF URBAN CHANGE
IN THE THATCHER YEARS

TIM BRINDLEY YVONNE RYDIN
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Preface

This book arose out of the three authors' parallel teaching and research interests, while based in three separate Schools at Leicester Polytechnic, as we struggled to come to terms with the fate of planning under the reforming Thatcher governments. We found that we had each started to investigate particular examples of planning policy and practice, in an attempt to understand the newly emerging forms of planning. As a team we had the advantage of complementary disciplinary roots in politics, economics and sociology. Together we gradually developed a common perception of the general direction of planning in the 1980s, starting from the recognition that it had fragmented into a number of distinctive and competing styles. Over lunchtime discussions and doodles on table napkins we worked out a preliminary classification. This led to the selection of the case studies, which enabled us to test and develop our ideas and eventually to formulate a typology. As it turned out, as soon as we started to write the book two of us moved away from Leicester and collaboration became rather more difficult!

Each of the authors worked on two case studies, which were therefore mainly the product of individual research, although they developed within the common framework and through a process of mutual criticism. Yvonne Rydin was mainly responsible for Chapter 3, on Cambridge, and Chapter 4, on Colchester; Tim Brindley was principal author of Chapter 5, on Coin Street, and Chapter 6, on London Docklands; and Gerry Stoker was the main author of Chapter 7, on GEAR, and Chapter 8, on Stockbridge Village. All other chapters were written jointly.

The case study method was chosen because it suited the project that we had set ourselves, namely to provide a relatively detailed account of the varieties of planning practice in the Thatcher years. This should be of interest to all practitioners, critics, students and would-be reformers of planning. We hope, too, that each case study stands on its own as a story or portrait of planning in particular local circumstances, and that this will make the book especially

PREFACE

useful to students as a complement to more theoretical or abstract planning texts.

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Cambridge City Council, Cambridge Urban Studies Centre, Colchester District Council, Colchester Urban Studies Centre, Coin Street Community Builders, Docklands Forum, Glasgow District Council, Knowsley Metropolitan District Council, London Docklands Development Corporation, Scottish Development Agency, South Cambridgeshire District Council and Stockbridge Village Trust.

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It goes without saying that the three authors alone are responsible for the interpretations, arguments and errors which follow.

Introduction

This is a book about planning in Britain in the 1980s, something which many think no longer exists. It is said that the Thatcher governments have all but abolished planning since 1979. The relaxation of many controls, the introduction of enterprise zones and simplified planning zones, the transfer of planning powers to urban development corporations, the greater stress on market criteria in development control decisions, all have been taken as lethal attacks on planning itself. Ravetz, for example, observes that:

the Thatcher Administration...is fast dismantling much of the planning system, along with many other parts of the Welfare State. This puts planning on trial, so to speak, for its life. (1986, p. 9)

For Ambrose (1986), who asks *Whatever happened to planning?*, the execution has already been carried out and it is time to write the obituaries.

Yet if we look at what has actually happened to planning in the past decade, we find that reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. Planning is still being practised, there has been no major reform of the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1968 and 1971, and development plans still have a significant role. Most of the changes in planning have been either revisions of policy within the existing system, or additions to the system, often involving both state intervention and public expenditure. While there has been a sustained attack on planning from the New Right, this has been vigorous in its rhetoric but rather less drastic in its actions. Planning has certainly changed, but it has not yet been eliminated.

The 'death of planning' thesis reflects a certain loss of perspective. Commentators from both centre and left political positions, and from within the planning profession, seem to have become imbued with a romantic notion of planning as if it were a uniquely social democratic, or even socialist, idea. They tend to look on planning legislation and policies as essentially idealistic and progressive, favouring the poor and powerless over the rich and powerful.

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Where planned development has fallen short of these ideals, and it often has, this is put down to a 'failure' of planning rather than an intended outcome. Proponents of this thesis appear temporarily to have forgotten that land-use planning has pursued goals of economic efficiency and maximizing land values as much, if not more than, those of social justice and equality. Consequently, they have been unable to recognize the policies of the New Right as 'planning' at all. This leads them to ponder the 'paradox' of a government which simultaneously criticizes planning and creates highly interventionist bodies such as the urban development corporations. But it is our contention that the paradox is a false one and that, despite the rhetoric, the Thatcher government is not anti-planning in the broad sense. Its attack has been on collectivist, 'welfare' or, as we term them, market-critical conceptions of planning, and its demands have been for new forms of planning more oriented to the market and the interests of developers.

It is the central theme of this book that the 1980s have witnessed first the fragmentation and then the remaking of planning, which is emerging from the past decade with its goals and purposes reorientated. Our argument springs from a broad definition of planning, which we take to refer to all activities of the state which are aimed at influencing and directing the development of land and buildings. In this sense, state intervention can be concerned with many different purposes, managed through diverse institutions, and can bring into play a variety of social and economic interests. The policy processes associated with state intervention are complex and conflict-laden, but they are always central to the direction of urban development and renewal. Our book is therefore concerned with the politics of urban change, focusing on the struggle between different forms of state intervention and the restructuring of planning styles that has taken place in the 1980s.

The change in the direction of planning has not happened cleanly or swiftly. While the central government has attempted to change the framework of planning policy and legislation, within this framework local authorities and local communities have continued to pursue their own, often quite different, goals. The result has been a rather confused picture, with a wide variety of approaches to planning being pursued simultaneously in different areas, and sometimes competing for dominance in the same area. Before we try to bring some order to this confusion, we need to consider how such a major change in the direction of planning came about. It emerges that it was not simply the result of the rise to power of a government committed to a particular ideology, but that it was rooted in a 'crisis' in planning and the context in which it was operating in the 1970s.

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The crisis in planning

We can begin our examination of planning's crisis with the inside view, looking at how it affected the profession. Ravetz (1980), in a perceptive and wide-ranging history of postwar planning in Britain, gives an account of the state of the profession in the mid-1970s. By then it was hard to find anyone with a good word to say about planning, and the profession was growing increasingly demoralized. She cites in particular the Town and Country Planning Association's 1977 report, *The crisis in planning* (Ash 1977), which recorded a 'public disillusionment with planning so widespread that one does not even feel obliged to document it'. Planning had failed to live up to its own claims and nobody's expectations seemed to have been satisfied. For some, it had failed to achieve the wholesale modernization of the built environment that it had so enthusiastically championed since the 1940s. The 'evangelistic bureaucrats' (Davies 1972) had run out of steam and the country was littered with half-completed urban motorways, unfinished slum clearance projects and partially redeveloped city centres. For others, it was the failure of planning to prevent undesirable development that was its chief weakness, whether in the form of surplus office blocks, industrialized council housing or the destruction of historic buildings. The whole direction of planning was being challenged, by grass-roots community activists and middle-class conservation societies. However much or little of this could be blamed on the statutory planning system, professional planners bore the brunt of the criticism and faced repeated accusations of failure. No wonder the profession began to lose confidence.

In the face of this unrelenting criticism, planners found it hard to know where to turn for their defence. As Ravetz points out, the real weaknesses of planning as a profession were revealed in its exaggerated claims to knowledge and expertise, and in its subordination to direct political control within state bureaucracies. In their claim for professional status, planners had pretended a greater knowledge of the processes of land and property development, and therefore of 'the future', than available disciplines could provide. They had also gone down the self-deluding path of 'affecting a fastidious political neutrality' (Blowers 1986, p. 16). As well as being exposed as a sham by academic criticism and political opposition, this had also left planners vulnerable to political manipulation by powerful interests. Too often they had appeared as charlatans in the pockets of the property development industry. The truth is that planning as a profession had become too closely associated with one set of goals, one approach to the future of the built environment,

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an ideology which Ravetz characterizes as the 'clean sweep' style. Planning had come to stand for wholesale change, but in the 1970s it began to emerge that not everyone wanted change on this scale, and that economic circumstances were going to make it much more difficult to achieve.

Opposition to change was opposition to the planners' vision of modernization. In the 1960s the planning profession had taken up the banner of modernization in an evangelistic spirit. Davies (1972) has pointed out how successive leaders of the profession, such as Colin Buchanan and Wilfred Burns, proclaimed an image of planning as the means to a better future. It was the duty of the planner to convince doubting fellow citizens to let go of the past and welcome the future, in all its concrete reality. As the voices of the objectors grew louder, the planning system offered 'participation' as the means to strengthen the consensus behind planning proposals. Instead, participation and protest demonstrated the blatant lack of consensus for change and exposed the political biases of the planners. The protest groups were varied and represented a wide range of interests. Some of the most vociferous were middle-class property owners objecting to motorway routes, but working-class residents also objected to the destruction of their inner-city neighbourhoods for speculative office development. Both professionals and tenants decried high-rise industrialized council housing. Local campaigners opposed the unnecessary destruction of established communities in slum clearance programmes. Middle-class and upper-class supporters of the burgeoning conservation movement helped to save areas such as Covent Garden and Bath from further destruction.

The lack of consensus for change put a major brake on development in the 1970s. Plans for redevelopment were suspended or reversed, slum clearance was replaced by gradual renewal, and the spirit of modernization suffered a major setback. If, as Cullingworth (1985) has argued, the new development plans system of the 1968 Act depended on consensus, then the absence of that consensus left its products – structure and local plans – indeterminate and vague. Where there were strong demands for change it was resisted, and where there was a need for change, it was compromised or neglected.

It was not only the expression of public attitudes which altered the pace and scale of development in the 1970s; it was also a major change in economic circumstances. If the modernization of the built environment, in the forms offered by the planners, was not universally desired, then neither was it any longer achievable. This began to become clear after the financial crises of the late 1960s when the long period of postwar economic growth first seriously faltered. The oil crisis of 1973 and the ensuing recession killed

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off most remaining plans for large-scale development and urban renewal. This exposed another underlying weakness of the planning system, its dependence on economic growth. The development plans system was based essentially on state regulation of private sector development. Where the state undertook development, this was mainly the provision of physical and social infrastructure (roads, schools, hospitals and housing), or else it was in partnership with the private sector. Consequently, when economic crisis pushed the private sector into recession and indirectly produced a major retrenchment in the state's direct role in development, there was little left to plan for.

Planning might have recovered from a temporary setback in growth in something like its old form, even overcoming much of the public resistance to change. But the 1970s quickly turned into a period of deep and prolonged economic decline, and this was something for which planning had few remedies. The gradual decline of northern England, Wales and Scotland had been apparent for some time. Successive governments had used regional aid and state development projects in an attempt to stem this decline, but to little effect. The 1970s saw a rapid rise in the rate of decline, particularly of manufacturing industry, coupled with the recognition that it was seriously affecting all of Britain's old industrial cities (Lawless 1981).

The processes of economic and industrial restructuring had a dramatic effect on particular localities, enormously increasing the disparities between different places. While some cities and towns experienced growth and new patterns of employment, others experienced massive decline and very high levels of unemployment. Areas such as the West Midlands suffered from the collapse of key sectors of manufacturing, including the machine tool, engineering and car industries. During the 1970s the industrial base of Birmingham shrank by a third (Spencer *et al.* 1986). In Sheffield in 1971 there were 139 000 people employed in manufacturing industry. Ten years later the number had declined to 90 000; and by 1987 it had collapsed to 58 000 (Sheffield City Council 1987, p. 7). In contrast to these areas of decline, Boddy *et al.* (1986) describe the experience of Bristol and the surrounding M4 growth corridor. Here, while traditional manufacturing declined, there was a considerable expansion of service sector industries, combined with the rise of newer activities based on electronics and high technology, leading to claims of an economic renaissance. One effect of these changes, which became manifest in the 1970s and continued into the 1980s, was to make 'locality' more significant (cf. Massey 1984). They brought different problems to the fore in different locations, lending

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support to the rise of new styles of state intervention and planning to meet these diverse challenges.

By the end of the 1970s the crisis in planning was deeply rooted and comprehensive in its scope. The two main supports of planning as an enterprise, a broad consensus in favour of change and economic growth to generate change, had both been seriously undermined. Planning was left exposed, vulnerable and confused; but it could not be abandoned. Whatever interests were in control of the various parts of the state, they would demand some sort of planning to ensure that their version of the future prevailed. A search began for new forms and styles of planning, to meet the needs of different localities, to bring about patterns of development desired by various interests and to match the political rhetoric of those interests. It was this process of evolution and experimentation which gave rise to the varied styles of planning which have characterized the 1980s, and of which this book attempts to give an account.

Structure of the book

The argument of this book is that, in response to changed social and economic circumstances, planning fragmented during the 1980s into a range of different forms. Chapter 2 provides a six-fold classification of the planning styles of the decade. Chapters 3–8 present detailed case studies of each of the styles in practice. The case studies show the main features of each planning style, focusing in particular on the institutional arrangements, types of politics, and conflicts and tensions associated with the different forms of state intervention. Chapter 9 sets out to compare the different planning styles in the light of the evidence presented in the case studies, developing the discussion of their effectiveness and outcomes. Chapter 10 concludes by arguing that the election in 1987 of the third Thatcher government confirms the new direction of planning, which is being remade with a predominance of market-oriented styles. We examine the nature of planning as it moves into the 1990s, the likely impact of the new approach, and how an alternative agenda might be established.

The fragmentation of planning

We have argued that the changed circumstances of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a crisis in planning, a collapse of confidence amongst both the public and professionals. This crisis is now manifested in the fragmentation of planning into a number of distinct approaches. It is our contention that the 1980s mark a turning point in the postwar history of planning. Previously, planning had been diversified in practice, with different local authorities developing their own policy variants and with localized experimentation. However, this diversification occurred within the context of a unified debate about planning, a debate which focused on the development plan system and the decision-making practices of professional planners. There was a general consensus on the role of the planning system, in terms of broad goals and means. Arguments concerned relatively minor procedural matters or rarefied planning theory.

The past decade has seen a heightening of economic and political conflicts within society, and this has been reflected in planning. The debate over planning has splintered as the lines of current economic and ideological cleavages have become more sharply delineated. A variety of new and old approaches to planning now vie with one another. This represents a moment of transition in planning history as one dominant ideology of planning attempts to replace another. In the meantime it is sometimes difficult to see anything other than a confusion of competing ideas, each promoted by a sectional interest. The purpose of this chapter is to inject some clarity into the current confused state of the debate, to identify the competing approaches and relate them to the prevailing economic and ideological cleavages.

We identify six styles of planning. Each style represents a particular stance in the debate on planning and proposes a particular mix of policy goals, working methods and identity for the planner. Some styles are strongly influenced by a radical vision and have the character of blueprints for local experiments. Other styles are not

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so new but rather derive from adaptations and modifications of established planning methods. Our central argument is that these various styles together capture the essence of the current state of planning, albeit in a simplified form.

It is important to recognize the limits of this planning debate. By and large, it has not focused on radical alternatives to the present system whether from the Right (Sorenson 1983) or the Left (Ambrose & Colenutt 1975). It accepts the liberal democratic framework of an interventionist state existing alongside a reliance on market operations, and puts forward proposals for dealing with the resulting tensions. In doing so each approach recognizes, at some level, the inevitable interrelation between the state and the market, that the market requires the support of state policies, and that the state relies on the market to produce many policy outcomes. Certain approaches are closer to a radical alternative than others and may even appear to disguise this underlying tension. But, as the case studies reveal, the tension surfaces at the implementation stage even if the rhetoric seeks to avoid it. In clarifying the planning debate of the current decade, we are therefore concerned to chart the plurality of proposals within the political framework of a liberal democracy. Other commentators have noted 'the increasing apparent variety in planning practice' (Healey 1983, p. 271) and the competition between a number of different proposals for the planning system (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986, Ch. 7). One way to organize this plurality is through the use of a typology. Our typology relates the six styles to the prevailing economic and ideological cleavages. These dimensions and the characteristics of the six styles are set out in the rest of this chapter.

A typology of planning styles

The typology is set out in Table 2.1. It is developed along two dimensions, which represent contemporary ideological and economic cleavages. The first dimension reflects the break-up of the ideological consensus on which postwar planning has rested. As the Nuffield Commission noted, there is still within planning circles a great desire to assume a consensus (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986, p. 97) but the reality of planning debate is that there is a sharp distinction between proponents based on their attitude to market processes:

... we have to distinguish between planning that takes a positive view of the market, while attempting to correct inefficiencies, and planning that

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takes a positive role in attempting to redress the inequalities of the market and to make good its omissions by measures to increase the access of the disadvantaged to housing, health, recreation and communal activity. This is one of the most important of the dimensions of disagreement which we shall analyse... (ibid., p. 184)

Table 2.1 A typology of planning styles

Perceived nature of urban problems	Attitude to market processes	
	Market-critical: redressing imbalances and inequalities created by the market	Market-led: correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes
Buoyant area: minor problems and buoyant market	regulative planning	trend planning
Marginal area: pockets of urban problems and potential market interest	popular planning	leverage planning
Derelict area: comprehensive urban problems and depressed market	public-investment planning	private-management planning

In styles which embody a positive view of the market, demand as measured by the consumer's purse is the main indicator of where and when development should occur. The market mechanism determines who receives what and at what cost. The main actors are in the private sector and profit is the motivation for their actions. Such market actions require a framework of state support, and planning policies are one way of providing this. Occasionally, where market outcomes are judged to be inefficient, additional planning powers will be brought into play. Nevertheless, market processes are considered to be a satisfactory mechanism of allocation in the majority of cases, indeed vastly superior to alternative mechanisms.

By contrast, in styles critical of the market, the outcomes of market processes are considered to be partly or even wholly unacceptable. The inequalities resulting from such processes are stressed, creating a need for planning policies to redress them. Planning is also needed to rectify imbalances, such as that between short- and

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long-term perspectives on resource use. This requires an organization which is not simply responding to market indicators but which will take a dominant role in defining the needs to be met and even in meeting those needs. The market mechanism may therefore be replaced in the pursuit of a more generally defined goal of welfare.

The second dimension of our typology reflects the impact of economic change over the past decade or more. As noted in Chapter 1, economic recession and the associated restructuring have had an uneven spatial effect and created increasingly sharp divisions between regions and localities. This is associated with a varying level of private sector interest in land and property between areas. The planning debate has sought to identify what should be the appropriate solutions for different areas facing different problems. Our categorization follows that of the Property Advisory Group report, *The structure and activity of the property development industry* (1980).

First, there are areas where the industry will invest without any public-sector support or subsidy. These might be termed 'buoyant' markets, of which the prime examples currently are sites for suburban housing schemes in the South East and large-scale out-of-town retail development in almost any part of the country. Secondly, there are areas where the industry could be induced to invest with appropriate support and subsidy from the public sector. These we can term 'marginal' areas in which the development industry has less confidence. Often these are areas which have suffered from prolonged periods of neglect but where the immediately surrounding area is such that the potential spread of economic activity may rekindle private-sector interest. Thirdly, there are areas where no subsidies can induce the development industry to invest. These 'derelict' areas have been abandoned by the private sector and are now viewed as 'no-go' areas. The Property Advisory Group described them as 'areas which are either unattractive or where there is little prospect of them becoming attractive' (para. 7.28).

Recognition of the particular impact of economic restructuring in different areas, together with the ideological split between market-led and market-critical approaches, characterizes the fragmentation of planning into distinct styles. So, in more prosperous areas, planning of a negative kind is considered most appropriate. Development interests consider the problems found in such localities to be minor ones, a view that is commonly shared by local middle-class residents. This does not preclude the existence of severe problems in terms of housing and employment opportunities for some of the local working-class population. However, these issues frequently do not find a political voice, and local advantages are seen

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to outweigh disadvantages. Planning is therefore largely directed towards improving or preserving existing living conditions.

The private sector exhibits considerable investment interest in this type of locality, and planning styles are consequently concerned with reacting to private development initiatives, not with actively encouraging them. Control and regulation are the key planning tools. This is true of both regulative and trend planning, the difference between the two styles being primarily one of degree. Regulative planning involves an attempt to control and direct market pressures in order to manage urban change in the public interest. Trend planning, by contrast, does not try to redirect market forces but applies minimal planning powers to facilitate development in line with market pressures.

In marginal areas a greater degree of positive planning is needed to bring the problem area up to the economic standards of the surrounding area. Sites of potential interest to the market may be satisfactorily developed but planning has to stimulate the change. Debate focuses on the planning mechanisms by which the public and private sectors are brought together to undertake this task of restructuring the local market. In popular planning the public sector is dominant, but acting primarily through the community rather than through government institutions. In leverage planning, the public sector also plays a significant role but the private sector is seen as the main agency of change. The two styles may be contrasted as, on the one hand, an attempt to regenerate community and public sector interest in the development of an area; and on the other hand, an attempt to regenerate an active private market, essentially by altering market conditions to make investment less risky and more profitable.

In derelict areas there is a widely perceived need for large-scale action to reverse, or at least manage, the urban decay, so there is a shift towards a totally planned local environment. Rather than the atomistic decision-making typical of market processes, the derelict area is brought under the control of one agency. Public-investment planning, in which the public sector redevelops an area by purchasing land and providing all or most of the capital investment, is favoured by some groups on the political Left. Private-management planning, on the other hand, involves private-sector agencies taking control of an area, even where public-sector assets are involved, and is a style favoured by the Right.

More than any of the other 'pairs' of planning styles, public-investment planning and private-management planning are in direct competition. Both are presented by their advocates as solutions to the worst problems that planning has to face. The first represents the claim that only the public sector can deal with these problems,

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the second the claim that only the private sector can provide the solutions. Given the definition of derelict areas offered by the Property Advisory Group, private-management planning in particular represents an act of unusual faith in the private sector.

The scope of the typology

In presenting a typology, our aim is to clarify the current planning debate, to organize the various proposals in relation to each other and to establish their essential characteristics. While we would argue that such a typology has certain advantages, it is nevertheless the case that any typology is limited by its own simplifying assumptions. We must emphasize that we are not trying to capture the complexity of planning thought and practice in a simple matrix. The complexity of the social processes involved in both practice and thought and of the relationship between them has to be recognized. There are three particular limitations which we want to acknowledge at the outset.

First, while the typology has an economic dimension, it does not provide a full representation of the processes which structure the local economy. These economic processes operate at the national, regional and local level to produce specific local economies and urban environments. Each locality has its own history of the interaction of these processes, distinct from any other locality (Rees & Lambert 1985). Furthermore, space is actively used in location strategies by the agents of urban change, as Massey (1984) has shown. The complexities of these multilevelled processes cannot be captured in three area-specific categories. Rather, our typology identifies the dominant perception of a particular area's local economy. We are not suggesting that by identifying that perception it is possible to read off in simple terms an appropriate planning style, for any local economy will contain sites where market demand is strong and other locations where no development interest exists at all.

Secondly, the typology presents a simplification of ideological stances as they operate at the local level. A distinction is proposed between approaches which are supportive of market processes and those which are critical. Although the Left may be associated with market-critical styles and the Right with market-led ones, it is not possible to reduce political allegiance to this one dimension. Again, the involvement of public sector agencies or public sector resources does not imply a market-critical approach, nor the involvement of the private sector a market-led approach. In practice there is a wide variety of ways in which the state supports, restructures and replaces the market. It is not always easy to identify the

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dominant ideology in any locality or to tie it down to one side of a market-led/market-critical divide.

Thirdly, the typology makes no claims as to explanation of the relationship between policy debate and policy practice. Many factors will influence the operation of planning in a particular locality. It is not intended that a particular form of planning practice in a locality be directly deduced from the two dimensions of the typology. Rather, the typology helps to organize ideas about planning. Planning practice is explored in the substantive case studies.

Despite these caveats, the adoption of such a typology does have distinct advantages. First, it simplifies the complexities of ideological debates and economic processes acting over space to a limited and manageable set of categories. Secondly, these categories reflect the terms in which public debate on planning is conducted, a debate which is often oversimplified in its understanding of urban processes. For example, British land policy has tended to operate in terms of planning for spatially delineated areas as in General Improvement Areas, Enterprise Zones or local plan areas. It can be argued that this tendency directs attention to local features of the area as the cause of urban problems and diverts attention from the broader economic processes (Parsons 1986). Nevertheless, planning thought and practice remains largely caught within the constraints of area-centred policies.

Thirdly, the typology provides a basis for identifying case studies for further analysis. It is in these case studies of planning practice that the complexities of economic and political processes can be explored. The ways in which the actual styles of planning evolve through implementation can be investigated (Barrett & Fudge 1981). In the case studies it will become apparent that two or more of the styles identified in our typology may be jointly operated in practice, that practice can move along a continuum between styles, and that no one style is uniquely identified with any one locality for any length of time. We do, however, suggest that the typology gives useful guidelines as to the dominant competing styles likely to be found in particular local economic circumstances during the 1980s. Before moving on to the case studies, we examine each of the styles in more detail.

Regulative planning: adapting to changed circumstances

Regulative planning lies at the heart of the postwar planning system established in Britain in 1947. Under planning legislation, local

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authorities have two principal functions. First, they are required to draw up plans for future development and land use. Second, they are given power to grant or refuse planning permission for most private-sector building and redevelopment schemes. It was argued that, by using these twin powers, local authorities could guide urban change so that it fitted their planning blueprints. To some degree British planners have been successful in this aim, particularly where they have sought to restrain development and contain urban sprawl as in Green Belt policy (Hall *et al.* 1973, Best 1981, Munton 1983). By reacting to private-sector initiatives many local authorities have exercised considerable negative control and displayed some potential for redirecting demand in line with public plans, in partial opposition to market forces.

This regulative planning style is central to the ideology of the planning profession. It enables the planner to pose as the expert manager of the urban system, a role buttressed by a number of ideological components, principally the rational and systematic mode of decision-making adopted by planners. This role also involves the assumption of an underlying consensus within society so that, in the face of competing interests, planners can claim to reach a judgment in the best interests of all (Simmie 1974, Ravetz 1980).

However, rational regulative planning in the public interest has not gone unchallenged. Criticisms have emerged from a variety of sources (some of which are taken up in the next section on trend planning). Left-wing analysts have emphasized the weakness of many aspects of the development control system, arguing that such planning follows rather than directs the market. Certainly, regulative planning is most effective when local demand is buoyant, since it can do little to stimulate private-sector initiatives. Some argue that the apparent postwar successes of planning control have in fact been related to the pattern of public investment in infrastructure, particularly in the New Towns (Ball 1983).

Even where development control is found to be affecting private-sector decisions, it has been argued that the outcomes are very unevenly distributed. Landowners, developers and owner-occupiers appear to be benefitting at the expense of others, such as the homeless, council tenants and the unemployed (Simmie 1981). The claim of planners to be acting in the public interest looks more suspect in the context of a society where conflicts of interest and extensive inequalities persist (Simmie 1974).

From the viewpoint of property developers and the political Right, regulative planning has been criticized as unnecessarily restrictive and constraining for the private sector (DoE 1975, House of Commons 1977). This criticism has been reinforced by an intellectual attack

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on the ability of the state to intervene rationally and effectively. Instead, New Right economists have re-emphasized the primacy and efficiency of the market (Adam Smith Institute 1983, Sorenson 1983, Green 1986).

Despite these criticisms, regulative planning remains the dominant image of planning, and the tools of the system are essentially geared to this end. Effective regulative planning is based on hierarchical strategic planning and a range of development control powers. While planners no longer expect to have total control over the pattern of urban change, they still seek to control individual private-sector developments in pursuit of public policy goals. However, the excesses of 'scientific' decision-making and the comprehensive approach have been downgraded. There is a new emphasis on negotiation and network-building skills in planning education (Underwood 1980, 1981). Through these skills planners seek to influence development proposals before and after planning applications are received, and to extract community benefit in the form of planning gain.

Trend planning: streamlining the system

The expression 'trend planning' was first coined in the 1970s by analysts keen to emphasize the powerlessness of regulative planning. In the aftermath of the property boom, development control was seen to have retreated from a directive, if reactive, system to a passive and completely ineffectual one (Broadbent 1977, Pickvance 1981). The tools available were seen as both clumsy and weak (Ambrose & Colenutt 1975, Kirk 1980). Planners were frequently subordinate in their dealings with property companies and developers, being easily persuaded and led (Dumbleton 1976, Wates 1976, Goldsmith 1980). In particular, the lack of public control over both land and investment funds meant that development control could not live up to its name. As Pickvance commented:

...in city centre business and financial districts most planning authorities would not consider any other sort of development besides offices. In other words, certain types of land use are seen as 'logical', 'sensible' and 'financially sound'. In city centres it is seen as 'illogical' to zone land for uses which are not the most profitable and which do not bring in the highest rates incomes. (1981, p. 70)

In short, in many development plans the allocation of land has been very similar to that which would have occurred under market forces.

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Trend planning now describes a head-on challenge to the existing regulative style, attempting to reorientate it to a private-sector perspective. In this form of planning, the negative powers of planners are not used to restrain or to bargain. Rather, development plans consciously reflect market trends in the allocation of resources, and planners are charged with facilitating development in line with market demand.

This style of market-led planning has been strongly promoted by the Thatcher administrations since 1979. It emerges in the concern to streamline the planning system and reduce delays (Thornley 1981), in the debate about the release of land for private housebuilding in Green Belt locations and areas of high demand (House of Commons 1984, Rydin 1986), and in the explicit introduction of market criteria into development control decisions (DoE 1980). The priority is private-sector development activity and responsiveness to market forces. As one recent Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment has commented:

Planners must help create the right conditions and ensure that consumer initiatives prosper ... planning procedures should not hamper the economic recovery ... Planning authorities must adopt a flexible and pragmatic approach to meet the ends of versatile enterprises ... I am determined that all planning authorities should be sympathetic to ... industry. (Jenkin 1984, pp. 15-16)

Where necessary, local discretion has been reduced to enforce the adaptation of the planning system to this style, through structure plan modifications, planning appeal decisions and the call-in powers of the Secretary of State for the Environment.

The most recent attempt to impose trend planning is contained in the proposals for Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs) in the 1986 Housing and Planning Act. Under these proposals, SPZs can be identified by local authorities or by the Secretary of State using default powers. A scheme of permitted uses will be prepared for each zone and any conforming development will not require planning permission. The process of development control will be completely bureaucratized. However, as our case study will show, there are political pressures for maintaining a degree of environmental control which currently hinder attempts fully to streamline planning decisions. The schemes for SPZs will therefore undergo procedures very similar to those for adopting local plans, including a public local inquiry where there are objections.

The likely impact of SPZs on the built environment is generally agreed to be minimal. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors

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regard the proposals as a missed opportunity. The Royal Town Planning Institute has not been unduly worried, although it has put forward its own ideas for off-the-peg planning permissions. Other commentators agree that SPZs are not a radical departure in planning practice (Thornley 1986). Robinson & Lloyd conclude:

The ideological significance to the government of SPZs would seem likely to be greater than their practical impact where the concept is adopted. (1986, p. 63)

It can be argued that these limits to the SPZ proposals reflect the role that planning can play in supporting the market. Trend planning in structure and local plans helps private investors and developers to coordinate and manage their investment plans (Farnell 1983). Thus land-use zoning and development control can be regarded as to some degree supportive of the operation of land markets by maintaining land and property values in some locations and preventing anarchic and damaging competition.

Trend planning therefore currently represents the end result of reorienting regulative planning from the public interest to the private interest. The response to the exposure of weaknesses in development control is not to reform or strengthen it, but to strip it to the bare bones. Only those aspects of planning are retained which seem to be functional for private development or which are electorally sensitive. As such, trend planning is only suited to areas broadly free of urban problems.

Popular planning: reviving the community

Popular planning is rooted in the public challenge to major planning proposals which emerged during the late 1960s. This took the form of organized opposition to development which threatened local communities, including slum clearance (Lambert *et al.* 1978), urban motorways (Hart 1976) and large-scale commercial developments (Wates 1976). This protest produced a large number of local action groups and campaigns, each fighting a specific issue. The Campaign for Homes in Central London (1986) identified 11 neighbourhood groups formed around housing issues alone between 1970 and 1974. At the same time the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act introduced statutory public participation in planning. Techniques for publicizing plans and consulting the public were recommended in the Skeffington report (Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1969) and adopted by many local

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authorities. While it may have been intended to defuse popular protest, public participation brought planning issues before a wider audience and provided more opportunities for opposition to be voiced. Public inquiries became the object of demonstrations and disruptive campaigns.

Popular planning seeks to go beyond the defensive anti-development campaign, and even beyond the enhanced consultation and participation procedures of the Skeffington report. Rather, it seeks the formal recognition and eventually the implementation of plans prepared by the local community. To achieve this aim there appear to be two prerequisites: an area of marginal concern to the development industry and a sympathetic public sector agency.

Marginal areas are most appropriate because they provide an economic space within which the community's demands can be satisfied. In more prosperous areas, the strength of development pressure is too great for the community to stand any chance in the competition with developers for sites. This is seen in Christensen's (1979) account of Covent Garden, where a popular plan, which began in opposition to major commercial and public-sector redevelopment, only gained ascendancy after 1973 when the property boom collapsed. Although this plan was eventually adopted as the statutory local plan, it is questionable whether that would have occurred in more buoyant market conditions. Indeed, subsequent growth of market interest in Covent Garden has meant that little of the popular plan has been implemented. So great is the contrast with the present that it is difficult now to recall the marginal nature of the area in the mid-1970s.

The Covent Garden plan also rested on the support of the Greater London Council (GLC) under a sympathetic Labour administration which lost office in 1977. The popular planning movement in general was given substantial encouragement by the election of a radical Labour GLC in 1980. It declared a Community Areas Policy (GLC 1985a) and created a Popular Planning Unit. The GLC defined 'Popular Planning' as

...planning from below - planning that is based on people coming together in their workplace and community organisations to formulate their own demands and visions for the future. Popular planning starts with resistance ... The second stage is the formulation of alternatives and the fight to put them into practice. (GLC n.d.)

The GLC also mooted the idea of Planning Action Zones where plans could be jointly prepared by the authority and local communities (GLC 1985b). The purpose of all these initiatives was

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to explore methods of positive planning for local needs in the blighted or decaying working-class neighbourhoods of Central and Inner London. The policy was based on the assumption that local authorities alone cannot overcome the deficiencies of the market without creating an active role for those people directly affected by the processes of change. Popular planning therefore combines state intervention with an active popular base.

The advocates of this style of planning see many benefits of popular participation. First, it can help to restore confidence to the people of areas subject to declining or fluctuating private-sector investment interest. To quote *The people's plan for the Royal Docks*:

We have brought together and into the public view, the demands of those who have suffered from false promises in the past. We have done this in order to give people in our area confidence in their own ideas, confidence that they have a right to have a say. (Newham Docklands Forum 1983, p. 5)

Secondly, a plan drawn up after extensive popular consultation is more likely to be in line with local needs. It stands some chance of avoiding the unpopular blunders of the recent past, such as multistorey housing for families and deck-access apartment blocks, and holds out the promise that the knowledge and expertise of local people can be incorporated into decision-making processes.

Thirdly, popular planning can establish a base of political support and pressure which is needed if the planning proposals are to come to fruition. As Wainwright notes, 'support for popular planning has meant helping people develop the confidence and organisational strength to challenge the power of those at the top' (1985, p. 7).

Before the GLC was abolished in 1986, none of its popular planning policies was accepted by the government, which continued to recognize only the 1976 Greater London Development Plan. However, the demise of the GLC does not mean the end of popular planning. The 'New Urban Left' of Ken Livingstone's administration is also evident in various London and other Labour-controlled councils, as well as within certain community groups. The aim pursued by these groups, through popular planning and other policies, is to restructure local economies and neighbourhoods. The tendency in the 1980s has been for local campaigns to form broader alliances with these local Labour parties and with trades unions, pursuing their specific aims under the banner of 'local socialism' (Lowe 1986). This is partly in reaction to the Thatcher government's centralizing tendencies; and partly an expression of a new concept of municipal socialism which is evolving independently on the Left.

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Popular planning is not a uniquely socialist ideal. Indeed, its most implacable opponents are found on the 'hard left' (McDonald 1986). Rather, it can be seen as part of a politically diverse movement for neighbourhood revival and local control of resources. Closely related are the community architecture and the community technical aid movements, which aim to bring control over both design and building to the end users of development (Wates & Kneivitt 1987). These movements received a boost in 1987 with the election of Rod Hackney to the presidency of the Royal Institute of British Architects. Hackney, himself a pioneer of community architecture, not only championed the cause but also brought it the patronage of the Prince of Wales and the apparent endorsement of the government and business interests. Popular involvement in planning and development has come to represent a moral ground which appeals to most political interests and ideologies. This unlikely consensus at least suggests that there will be continuing opportunities for popular planning in marginal areas.

Leverage planning: stimulating the market

The essential ingredient of leverage planning is the use of public-sector finance to stimulate a weak market and to release a greater volume of private-sector investment. Although the idea of bringing in the private sector has been strongly promoted by the Conservative governments since 1979 (DoE 1982, Heseltine 1983), it is not a new approach. There have been many examples of partnerships between the public and the private sectors, throughout the postwar period. The practice of the public sector clearing sites and providing physical infrastructure to support private-sector investment also has a long postwar history. In various ways the state has been willing to underpin the private sector, effectively subsidizing development schemes that might not otherwise have gone ahead.

However, since 1979 leverage planning has had a more prominent role, particularly within carefully delineated spatial boundaries which define a market capable of stimulation. This was first seen in the establishment of Enterprise Zones and, more recently, Freeports (Massey 1982, Hall 1983, Lloyd 1984). The designation of an Enterprise Zone brought exemption from rates, development land tax (now abolished) and industrial training levies, both for existing land users and businesses and for those wishing to move in. Until March 1985, capital investment in industrial and commercial buildings attracted 100% tax allowances. Subsidies have also been directed at firms involved in specific projects through the Urban Development

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Grant (UDG) and its Scottish equivalent, LEGUP (Boyle 1985). These grants have been used to support conversion, improvement or redevelopment schemes in which a substantial proportion of the cost is met by the firm itself.

Indirect subsidies have also been used. For example, local authorities have reclaimed land to make it suitable for redevelopment at no cost to the private sector. They have also granted licences to housebuilders to develop publicly owned sites for private sale. Thus site acquisition costs have been reduced or eliminated, creating greater profitability for development schemes that otherwise might not have attracted private investment. Many low-cost home-ownership schemes have been launched in the 1980s on the basis of these forms of hidden subsidy (Forrest *et al.* 1984).

The prime example of leverage planning in the 1980s is the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), which we examine in detail in a case study. As its Chief Executive has explained, its primary objective is to generate private-sector investment (House of Commons 1984, para. 651). The establishment of the LDDC and its Merseyside counterpart was followed in 1987 by the designation of five further urban development corporations (UDCs).

The second batch of UDCs are Trafford Park (near Manchester), Cardiff Bay, Tyne and Wear, Teeside and a Black Country UDC based in Sandwell and Walsall. These UDCs have each been promised about £160 million of public investment over a five-year period. Their aim will be to stimulate a dramatic increase in the level of private-sector investment in their areas. None is expecting the scale of private-sector response seen in London's Docklands, but each is confident that development proposals can be attracted to their area. A third wave of UDCs was announced later in 1987 and in early 1988 covering Central Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol.

The principal features of all these examples of the leverage planning style are first, subsidies to private-sector development, either directly through low-cost land sales or indirectly through infrastructure investment; and secondly, a flexible, even entrepreneurial, attitude to development proposals. The approach carries with it a strong implied criticism of the past record of local authorities in dealing with problems in these areas. Instead, emphasis is laid on the potential of the private sector to solve the problems, if only they had more confidence in the area. Considerable effort and money is therefore expended on boosting such confidence and improving the area's image.

This style of leverage planning is, as Young (1985) points out, highly interventionist. Although the political rhetoric behind this approach has emphasized the role of the private sector, in practice it depends on strong initiatives and a very active role by the

public sector. Public officials are required to develop contacts with private-sector agencies and, in many cases, to put together a complete development package to be sold to private-sector investing institutions: 'This is not an arm's length activity. It is a "hands-on" interventionist approach' (*ibid.*, p. 21).

Public-investment planning: directing urban change

There are many examples of this style of planning in the postwar period. Comprehensive Development Areas, first proposed by the 1945-51 Labour government as a mechanism for dealing with bomb-damaged areas, were envisaged as planning by public investment. The state purchased the land, compulsorily if necessary, and undertook most of the redevelopment. Large areas of Birmingham, Coventry and other cities were renewed in this way (Ravetz 1980). Public investment was therefore seen as a means of dealing with severe dereliction.

The most widely praised example of the ability of the public sector to plan urban change by investment is not, however, found in derelict areas but in the New Towns. Instigated by the New Towns Act of 1946 and developed from the much earlier ideas of the Garden City movement, this was the lynchpin of many policies: an instrument of regional planning; an example of sensitive local planning; a location for overspill council housing; and the counterpart to urban containment policy. The successful implementation of New Towns rested on a massive public-sector investment programme, providing urban infrastructure as well as services and urban facilities. The whole was coordinated by a public-sector plan, within which the private sector played a distinctly subordinate role. Direction remained the prerogative of the state, even in later years of the programme when more private investment was brought in.

More recently, public-investment planning has been specifically directed to the rescue of derelict areas. An important example of redevelopment by public-sector investment is the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project (GEAR), initiated in 1976 as the successor to the proposed Stonehouse New Town. GEAR forms the subject of our case study of public-investment planning. In this case local authorities, public-sector infrastructure bodies and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) have together put substantial funds into rebuilding one of the most run-down areas in Scotland. The public sector has funded and coordinated the proposals for change.

Given the dominance of New Right ideologies at national government level, it is perhaps surprising to find that there are still

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localities in which planning by public investment is being strongly promoted. The initiative has come from some left-wing Labour local authorities, who have made an attempt to rebuild inner areas on non-market principles. The enterprise boards and Sheffield City Council are perhaps the main surviving examples (Boddy 1984, Wainwright 1987). Although there are significant differences between them, all of these bodies have attempted to redirect publicly controlled funds to support their local economies. In addition, they have used the considerable purchasing power at their disposal to maintain local employment.

Underlying these policies, and public investment planning in general, is the view that the British economy has been weakened by the investment plans and priorities of private-sector financial institutions – the banks, insurance companies, building societies and pension funds. Deindustrialization, decentralization and the resulting desolation of many urban areas is seen not as an accident of world economic trends but as a direct result of investment decisions by the agents of finance capital (Community Development Project 1977). It is therefore considered unrealistic to expect these same agents to provide the necessary investment to rebuild the inner areas. Only by the public sector taking over this role to direct socially useful development can the economic base of these areas be rebuilt.

This style of planning therefore exhibits great faith in the public sector, given comprehensive planning at all levels, good coordination between levels and adequate funding. Planners within this style 'network' in order to gain resources and implement strategies. The goals that can be achieved are similarly comprehensive, covering housing, employment, social welfare and regional balance, amongst others. The potential of such total planning for an area still attracts many on the Left. The question mark which hangs over this strategy concerns the ability of area-specific and limited investment resources to counteract the trends set in motion by huge flows of finance under the control of private institutions.

Private-management planning: handing over to the private sector

From the perspective of the New Right, the recovery of the most deprived and run-down areas of our towns and cities ought to be achieved not by massive state intervention, but by handing over the management of the whole renewal process to the private sector. This goes well beyond leverage planning, and draws in not only private-sector financial resources but also the managerial methods,

skills and experience of the private sector. Its dynamism, creativity and energy, it is argued, can be harnessed to pull the run-down areas up by their boot straps, with the co-operation of local people and businesses (Heseltine 1983, 1986).

In the early 1980s some policy advisers have gone even further and proposed a new type of private-sector managed and funded city development agency to bring deprived inner areas up to national standards in housing and employment. They argue that it is only by the private sector taking such areas into its care that the processes of renewal and recovery can be made to work (Moor 1984, Henney 1985). A number of *ad hoc* initiatives have supported this vision of a new role for the private sector. The disposal of council estates to private developers for renovation and resale has encouraged the idea that private agencies are able to take over such areas. In a few cases the process has been extended to private-sector involvement in the management of renewal, through the mechanism of a non-profit-making private trust. Stockbridge Village, Knowsley, provides our case study and is a key example. The former GLC estate at Thamesmead has also been taken over by a trust.

A similar growth in private-sector involvement can be observed in the economic development field. The Community of St Helen's Trust, for example, was founded in 1978 as a result of the concern of Pilkingtons, the glass makers. Other initiatives and trusts, involving major companies such as Marks & Spencer, GEC and IBM, have followed. In 1982, with the government's encouragement, 'Business in the Community' was formed to promote such enterprise trusts and agencies.

Young (1985, 1986) identifies these ideas and initiatives as part of a broader strategy of privatization adopted by the Conservative governments since 1979. Under this strategy, private-sector agencies take on tasks that were previously seen as the exclusive responsibility of the public sector. Since these tasks are pursued within a broad framework of government policy, what is achieved amounts to the private management of public policy.

An important question is on what basis can the private sector be persuaded to undertake such a role? After all, the deprived inner areas are precisely those locations which the private sector has abandoned. Young argues that the Conservatives are in fact involved in 'a long-term attempt to persuade, cajole and tempt companies into believing they have a responsibility ... to the community at large' (1985, p. 26). For reasons of improved public relations, or out of genuine concern, some private companies may well be prepared to undertake some special projects of this nature. But it is the belief of some Conservatives that it should be possible to establish a broader

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corporate responsibility among major private-sector companies. The aim is to obtain a recognition on the part of business that it cannot simply opt out of concern for the social and economic problems of the country.

Another feature of this form of private-management planning is the extent to which public-sector subsidies, either hidden or more openly provided, are likely to be necessary for the success of projects. The way in which public-sector resources appear to underwrite the private-management planning style emerges as a major theme in our case study of the Stockbridge Village Trust. Such public-sector subsidy is also built into the Housing Action Trusts which were announced after the Conservative's election victory in 1987 and embodied in a White Paper, *Housing: the government's proposals*, of the same year (DoE 1987).

From typology to case studies

In this chapter we have identified six styles of planning and the essential characteristics of each style have been discussed. Although aspects of all six styles can be seen in British planning debates before the 1980s, we are arguing that together, in their current forms, they constitute a turning point in the history of planning, with important implications for both the practice of planning and urban policy generally. This reflects our belief that planning experienced a crisis in the 1970s. The debate which encompasses these six styles is part of the process by which that crisis is being resolved. The current fragmentation of planning into a number of distinctive styles has resulted from accelerated economic restructuring, which has heightened the contrast between local areas, and from a growing polarization of political ideologies, which has emphasized the contrasts between left- and right-wing attitudes to planning.

The purpose of the case studies, presented in the next six chapters, is to see how far each proposed planning style constitutes a coherent and distinctive approach in practice or if, instead, they differ more in their rhetoric than in their substantive effects. In doing so we will be moving from the arena of ideology and debate over planning solutions to that of policy practice, its formulation and implementation. Such practice is often chaotic and its effects unanticipated. This is partly because the policies themselves are not coherent, and each proposed style contains inherent contradictions. Partly it is because policies are being implemented in circumstances in which local agencies are forced to engage in opportunism, experimenting with many policies in the competitive search for resources, public

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and private. The result is not straightforward. It is not to be expected that any planning style is unproblematically implemented. This is particularly the case if one accepts that part of the function of proposing certain styles is ideological.

Case studies provide an ideal opportunity for exploring the styles as they operate in practice. Each case study allows in-depth analysis of a style and, in particular, of the interaction between agents that constitutes the practice of planning. They are the most appropriate method of studying processes, in this case the processes that characterize planning practice in the Thatcher years. In each of our case studies these processes are examined in relation to three key issues: the institutional arrangements of the style; the politics and mode of decision-making adopted; and the resulting conflicts and tensions. The distinctiveness and key characteristics of each of the planning styles becomes even more apparent as attention is directed towards these issues.

Regulative planning: the Cambridge area

Regulative planning has been identified by us as a style of planning appropriate to buoyant local economies. In such circumstances, it is argued, it should be possible for the public sector to harness the energies of the private sector, to divert and influence development in the knowledge that potential profits are high and marginal developments are few. The key to control lies in providing restricted development opportunities in certain locations and in exercising a veto of development in other areas. In this way concessions, in the form of a share of development profit, may be won for the local community. Individual private-sector developers accept such control in order to get some development rights, although there may also be more general benefits to the development industry in, for example, limiting competition between developers and providing an orderly pattern of development.

Regulative planning is the public sector making full use of the powers of development control contained in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. The local community benefits from protection of certain areas from any development, and the assessment of permitted development in terms of goals and criteria set by the community. The goals themselves are agreed through the participatory aspects of the planning process and the operation of representative democracy within the local council.

The Cambridge area

Examining regulative planning in practice requires a case study of a strong local economy since a high degree of private-sector interest is the prerequisite for such planning control. The Cambridge area provides an excellent example, for it is one of the local economic success stories of the 1980s (Fig. 3.1). The region of East Anglia extends eastwards to the North Sea and covers large




Figure 3.1 Map of the Cambridge area, showing places referred to by the case study

areas of agricultural land. Rural poverty is a problem over parts of the region, but its very rurality has allowed East Anglia to benefit from the shift in industrial location from urban to more rural areas (Fothergill & Gudgin 1982). More importantly, the region has the dynamic growth poles of Cambridge and Peterborough on its western edge. The percentage growth figures are therefore impressive, although it should be remembered that they are measured from a low base level.

In the mid-1970s, East Anglia was the only region to record an increase in manufacturing employment. By the period of June 1979 to March 1983 the recession had begun to bite but East Anglia, along with the South East, had the lowest regional levels of employment decline (5.7%) in the country. The percentage decline in manufacturing was lower than for the South East, and it was the only region to register an increase in service employment over the period. In the more recent period of March 1983 to September 1985, East Anglia had the highest percentage increase in total employment (7.9%) and in both manufacturing (2.9%) and service (12.2%) employment (Martin 1986). Such relative prosperity has drawn high levels of in-migration, with the result that population growth for the region has also been greater than for other regions: 13% during 1961-71 and 12% during 1971-81.

Within the region, the picture for Cambridge and the surrounding area is even rosier. The city is 55 miles north of London, 25 miles from Stansted and benefits from the M11 and two rail services into London. Unemployment rates in Cambridge are low, at 7.4% for the city and 5.1% for the Cambridge area as a whole. Cambridge's population grew by 11.6% during 1961-71 and then by 14.4% during 1971-81. The pressures for growth are likely to continue with the expansion of Stansted, the electrification of the route into Liverpool Street (which will reduce the journey time to under one hour) and the possible electrification of the other route into Kings Cross. Furthermore, the local economy is experiencing strong indigenous growth. The purchasing power resulting from these trends, together with over £100 million spent by at least three million tourists each year, makes Cambridge a major retail centre and pushes retail rents up to high levels.

The current dynamism of the Cambridge local economy undoubtedly rests on the so-called 'Cambridge Phenomenon', the growth of high-technology industry in the area. 'Silicon Fen' ranks alongside 'Silicon Glen' and the M4 corridor as one of the specialized localities where the new post-industrial revolution is occurring. The Cambridge Science Park opened in 1973 and since then there has been considerable growth in high-tech firms (Carter & Watts 1984,

Segal, Quince & Partners 1985). The pressures of this growth and the associated planning potential are the major issues facing local authorities in the area.

Regulative planning in Cambridgeshire, 1945-76

Local planning in and around Cambridge has a history of tight control of development and, unusually, has enjoyed fairly consistent ministerial support for strong regulative planning. The key to this history lies in the importance of the University (here used to include colleges, faculties and the University) in local politics, in local land ownership, and in local employment. Throughout the postwar period, local planning has been based on the premise that Cambridge should remain predominantly a university town. During the years 1931-48 it seemed as if industrial growth was going to eclipse the University. By 1948 there were three industrial operatives and two public-sector employees for every University employee (Senior 1956). The spectre of Oxford was raised; Cambridge, it was felt, should not allow industry to develop as Cowley had developed in Oxford. This principle was built into the first plans prepared under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act.

In fact, the benefits of planning control had already been seen by the local council. As early as 1925, a town planning scheme had been prepared for East Cambridge. Planning activity within Cambridge City Council continued right through to World War II. Then, in the first of several ministerial interventions, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, Lewis Silkin, proposed that a planning consultant be called in. The result of the ministerial proposal was the 1950 Holford Wright Plan. This implied limiting future growth to a maximum population of 100 000 for the city, resisting industrial development and, in particular, discouraging any form of mass production. The 1954 County Development Plan, including Town Map 1 for Cambridge, was based on these principles, as was the 1957 Town Map 2 covering the ring of villages around Cambridge. Growth was to be dispersed beyond these villages, which would only take limited additional population. The Department of Trade and Industry supported this policy in its attitude towards issuing Industrial Development Certificates.

The first review of Town Map 1, approved in 1965, continued tight restraint and spelt out the policy in more detail. Only new industries employing five or fewer people were to be permitted, together with moderate expansion of existing firms. New industry

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linked to the university, i.e. 'science-based industry' and research and development activities, would be viewed more favourably. The success of these policies in the University's terms was evidenced by the fact that, in the period from World War II to 1966, the university population grew five times as fast as the city population.

Throughout the 1960s, in common with development plans elsewhere, these restrictive policies came under pressure from population and economic growth. The City Council was also concerned at the implications of such tight restraint for the growth of Cambridge and the employment prospects for local people. Their 1966 document *The Future Shape of Cambridge* therefore proposed increasing the limit on population growth to 120 000. The 1971 County Development Plan Review was also more relaxed in its attitude, particularly towards science-based industry. Furthermore, the Parry Lewis Report on the Cambridge subregion, published in 1974, called for a new settlement just outside the city to the south, based around a hypermarket. Growth was seen as inevitable, the result of general economic trends, but authorities involved in planning at all levels were concerned to control that growth, both in magnitude and location.

In the event Parry Lewis's proposal was rejected. Instead, three residential sites to allow for the extra 20 000 people were allocated in the 1976 Development Plan Review for the Cambridge sub-area. Restraint on industry continued and no new office development was allowed in the central area. Elsewhere, potential office developers had to demonstrate a link with the subregional function of Cambridge. This 1976 document was adopted by the County Council but not as a statutory plan; rather it formed part of the work on the first structure plan.

Structure planning

The *Cambridgeshire structure plan* was submitted to the Secretary of State for the Environment in 1978 and was approved, with modifications, in 1980. This document shows both the continuing concern of the county to control growth and its desire to achieve social goals through land-use planning. Three alternative strategies were put forward: conservation of the *status quo*; encouragement of economic growth; and an attempt to reduce inequalities within the county. The selected strategy combined social objectives with an element of conservation, a potentially conflicting combination (Healey 1983, p. 13). The four stated aims of the structure plan were:

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- (i) the adequate provision of jobs, services and facilities with priority for the existing population and its natural increase rather than for the needs of the incoming population;
- (ii) the improvement of the quality of life in those parts of the county and for sections of the community which are relatively disadvantaged;
- (iii) the protection of high quality agricultural land and a reduction in the rate of consumption of non-renewable resources of all kinds;
- (iv) the conservation and improvement of the urban and rural environment. (*ibid.*, p. 20)

In practice, this involved following the 1974 report of the Regional Strategy Team, *Strategic choice for East Anglia*, in seeking to divert growth from the south and west of the county towards the Fenlands areas in the north and east. A degree of restraint on industrial and office development in and around the city remained, and local links had to be demonstrated before development was permitted. The intervening six years to structure plan review have brought surprisingly few changes in intention. The review was scheduled for an Examination in Public in late 1987 and approval in early 1988.

The aims are almost identical to the 1980 document. The strategy still seeks to divert growth within the county and argues that 'the potential for economic development and employment growth in the county should be fulfilled within a positive guiding framework'. Industrial development is still restricted to scientific and R&D activities and small firms. Speculative office development is discouraged. Growth pressures in the 1980s had led to previous targets for residential development being breached, and it was feared that considerable land would have to be allocated for new housing. However, changed population forecasts and negotiation within the County Council resulted in a downward revision of the figures. Instead of two new settlements outside the city to accommodate growth, only one is now proposed. Altogether, the structure plan proposes an extra 54 400 new dwellings in the county over the period 1986-2001. Some 15 200 dwellings will be required in the Cambridge sub-area.

Local plans, development briefs and planning gain

It has to be said that the rhetoric of control in structure planning is not unusual, though Cambridgeshire has had more support than most other counties for a policy of restraint. The test of regulative

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planning lies in the effective implementation of such policies. This section examines the implementation of policy through local plans and development control at the district level.

In the Cambridge area this falls to two local authorities: Cambridge City Council and South Cambridgeshire District Council (South Cambs. District Council). The reorganization of local government in 1974 left the boundaries of the city tightly drawn with the surrounding rural area, the developing suburb of Cherry Hinton and various villages all falling within the South Cambs. District. As will be explored later, this can give rise to political and organizational conflicts but, on the principle of effectively controlling development pressure, the two councils are largely in agreement.

Until recently, both the City Council and South Cambs. District Council have relied heavily on the statutory development plans, the 1965 and 1957 Town Maps, for detailed development control guidance (supplemented by the broader policies of the structure plan where relevant). District plans have so far been used on an *ad hoc* basis, although South Cambs. District Council is now preparing a district-wide plan. To date, the City Council has prepared three district plans: for St Matthews (1977), Newnham/West Cambridge (1984) and Romsey (1986) (Fig. 3.1). South Cambs. District Council has also prepared three: for the villages of Waterbeach/Landbeach (1983), Sawston/Pampisford/Babraham (1984) and Milton (1985).

The Romsey and St Matthews plans cover areas of later-19th-century terraced housing, some lower-density interwar housing (mainly in Romsey), local shopping and various industrial uses, often within the residential areas. Housing and environmental improvement are the main issues. Implementing improvement policies in the early 1970s had not been entirely successful. The City Council's approach had alienated many local residents. Following the recommendations of the 1969 Skeffington report, a more participative mode of dealing with improvement policies was therefore encouraged, and in 1975 the City Council published a manual for engaging in this sort of community involvement (Darlington 1975).

This clearly informed the district plan exercise in St Matthews. In addition to the more common programme of meetings with local residents, exhibitions and talks, the council undertook new initiatives. A working party of 16 residents, six ward councillors and planners led the development of policy; a 'planning shop' was opened in the area; and a newsletter was regularly circulated. On the basis of local involvement, two uncompleted Comprehensive Development Areas, which were causing blight, were abolished. A policy of enhancing the residential environment and of rehabilitation was adopted, and a General Improvement Area (GIA) approved in 1977.

The implementation of improvement policy, community development and the preparation of the district plan went hand in hand. It could be argued that the enhanced participation arrangements represent the first tentative steps towards the popular planning style. But the planning purpose was improved regulative planning, and the final document emphasizes the various powers available to the local authority to direct urban change: enforcement action, discontinuance powers, public health legislation, traffic management, and development control itself. The plan is now being updated with a view to making it a statutory document, and therefore more defensible at appeal.

The *Romsey district plan* covers an area adjacent to and similar to St Matthews, but the GIA here had been established prior to the district plan exercise of 1981-6. Whereas the St Matthews plan of the 1970s represents an attempt to move beyond the prevailing regulative planning style, the Romsey plan is very similar to the other four district plans mentioned, all prepared in the 1980s. Plan preparation was more conventional in its consultation with local residents and in document layout. The result was more formal and perhaps less 'user-friendly'.

The common link between the five plans of the 1980s is that each plan seeks to provide detailed guidelines for regulative planning in specific local circumstances. In particular they seek to exercise detailed control over new developments. The three South Cambs. District Council plans arose from the need to allocate specific sites following the approval of the structure plan. The Romsey plan had to deal with three key sites ripe for development, as well as resisting more general pressures for redevelopment and intensification in the area. The Newnham/West Cambridge plan was faced with intense development interest from the private sector, and a need to come to terms with the plans of the university, who own most of the land in the area.

The preferred strategy used in the plans is to include development briefs for particular sites. These set out precisely the requirements to be met before planning permission will be granted for the sites. The local authorities are here engaged in an exercise to influence development in order to meet community goals concerning the standard and nature of development. The district plan is used to advertise the council's development control powers and the concessions necessary for the grant of development rights. This is no open-ended promotion of a development site. Rather, the council sets the terms of negotiation on a planning application. This is, in effect, an invisible form of planning gain, since the planners are influencing the planning application before it is even submitted.

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This form of influence is not normally acknowledged as planning gain. Instead attention has been focused on the more overt forms of planner influence (such as Section 52 agreements and concessions subsequent upon negotiation) and on the more substantial concessions such as community centres and commuted car parking payments (Jowell 1977, Hawke 1981, Reade 1982). The routine exercise of power, affecting the preparation of proposals within the developer's office, should not be underestimated. These development briefs cover specifications for development density, dwelling mix, landscaping, access, parking, cycleways, phasing, children's play areas, soundproofing and standard of design – a comprehensive list! Even the planners do not necessarily accept this as planning gain but it is a clear case of controlling private development proposals in order to meet public goals.

More overt examples of planning gain can also be found. South Cambs. District Council uses Section 52 agreements (contracts between the applicant and the local authority conditional upon the grant of planning permission), mainly to deal with drainage problems on sites to the north of Cambridge due to the lack of Anglian Water Authority investment, though they have also been used to maintain open space. On certain applications the committee asks planners to negotiate concessions but, given the limited scale of development allowed in the district, it is recognized that the extent of overt planning gain will be commensurately modest.

The City Council relies heavily on negotiation, e.g. to upgrade the standard of development through the use of higher-quality materials. Negotiation, in conjunction with the council's power as a landlord on various industrial estates, is also used to relocate non-conforming industrial users from residential areas. Section 52 agreements may reinforce the use of standard development control powers, including discontinuance and enforcement powers, in such cases. In addition, local user conditions are routinely attached to office consents in the city. In many parts of the city these powers are given additional bite by the large Conservation Area (extended in 1980) and the widespread use of Tree Preservation Orders.

The use of development control powers to extract planning gain, in whatever form is, however, dependent upon the level of development pressure. Where the pressure is not urgent, regulative planning loses its force. For example, the Newnham/West Cambridge Plan accepts the long established prior claim of the University to develop the vacant areas to the west of the city. However, the University can take a very long-term view when it comes to development of its land, and thus precise details cannot be laid down. For example, the University has had plans to develop the Old Addenbrookes Hospital

site in the town centre since 1962 (Cambridge University 1962); contracts were only exchanged in 1985 and development of only part is currently proposed. This makes it very difficult to include detailed site-specific planning policy in the local plan (it currently contains only one, for a research park), and any negotiation must wait on the University to submit a planning application.

Local planning and the Cambridge Phenomenon

Regulative planning involves an attempt to fulfil certain objectives through a fairly clumsy set of tools: structure and local plans, and the legal powers of development control. The objectives may be clear-cut, as in the case of very restrictive exclusionary planning, or they may involve a more complex set of social aims including employment maintenance, design standards, relocation of non-conforming uses, economic balance within a county, etc. It is in the pursuit of these more complex aims that the limitations of a regulative planning style based on negative control of largely private-sector initiatives become most apparent. This is currently very evident in the Cambridge area, because of the substantial development pressure which is emanating from the high-tech industrial sector. This section considers the application of regulative planning in the context of the Cambridge Phenomenon.

Given the outstanding reputation of the University of Cambridge for scientific research, there have long been local proposals to link academics with appropriate industry. This was evident in the industrial policies of the earliest development plans. However, the Cambridge Phenomenon, the growth of high-tech firms in the area, is usually tied to the opening of the Trinity College Cambridge Science Park (Fig. 3.1).

First proposed in 1969, the Cambridge Science Park (CSP) had its first tenants in 1973. Letting was fairly slow during the 1970s but since then the park has become the focal point of high-tech growth. It currently covers some 82 acres with a fourth phase proposed on another 26 acres, leaving a further 18 acres for later expansion. By late 1984 there were over 40 tenants, all occupying purpose-built accommodation. As has now become the norm with high-tech 'campus' developments, site coverage is low at 20%, allowing room for expansion, with a very high standard of landscaping, design and materials. Strict control over the development has come from two sources. The owner of the site and the developer, Trinity College, has used restrictive covenants in the individual leases. In addition,

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South Cambs. District Council, the local planning authority for most of the site, has used its regulative planning powers.

The site was intended to be within the green belt and applications for housing and industry had been rejected during the 1960s. However, a review of policy in the light of the 1969 Mott report by a Senate subcommittee led to its identification as suitable for a Stanford-type science park. Having accepted the principle of such development, the district council then used a Section 52 agreement to guide that development. The agreement mainly controlled the use of the buildings and landscape maintenance. The control over use was particularly important since the then-current Use Classes Order would have allowed other forms of light industry and/or speculative offices to establish themselves without the need for planning permission. It was therefore necessary to use a Section 52 agreement to extend the limits of planning control (Brook 1983).

The recent review of the Use Classes Order, which proposes a new business class merging light industry and office uses, is intended to deal with this problem. The Royal Town Planning Institute argues that this will still not allow planners to control high-tech development in the way the market itself would wish, identifying a possible market-support role for regulative planning. Representatives of developers seem most concerned that the new Use Classes Order should reassure local planners and councillors and thus encourage the granting of planning permissions in situations of current restraint. In Cambridgeshire a local attempt is being made to solve the problem by providing a definition of high-tech development in the structure plan review.

The development of the CSP is generally regarded as a success in strict commercial terms and in the scope of its economic impact. It has become the market leader for high-tech development in the area. Recent research has estimated that in mid-1984 there were over 300 high-tech firms in the area with a joint turnover in excess of £890 million (Segal Quince & Partners 1985). The majority of firms are young and small, with a low failure rate compared to other new, small firms and with a greater tendency to generate spin-off companies. They are usually specialized, subcontracting precision engineering and similar tasks. The Cambridge Phenomenon is now very much a self-generating one, but changes are on the way with the increasing presence of international companies and the rapid growth of a few firms to a much larger size.

The growth of the Cambridge Phenomenon has been attributed to a number of factors. The promotional role of the university (e.g. in allowing intellectual property rights to accrue to the individual) and the availability of finance (initially from Barclays Bank) were early

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stimulants. More recently, firms have chosen the Cambridge location because of family links, the pleasant local environment and the prestige of the address, thus echoing research on high-tech industry elsewhere (Macgregor *et al.* 1986). The network of information and personnel between the firms themselves is considered important in generating growth and spin-offs, as are contacts with the university, but the precise significance of a location near a higher education establishment is debated (Haugh 1986).

Within this list of influences, credit should be given to the role of planning policies themselves. Following meetings between the county and city planning officers and representatives of local high-tech firms, the policies have actively supported high-tech development proposals. The strict criteria applied in individual developments have helped maintain the prestige quality of this sector of the market. Furthermore, the restrictive aspects of planning policy applied to other development, particularly industry, have perhaps unknowingly set the context within which high-tech industry can flourish. In the 1960s IBM was refused planning permission to locate its European R&D laboratories in Cambridge; analysts have suggested that if planning permission had been granted, the Cambridge Phenomenon might never have happened (Segal, Quince & Partners 1985, p. 63).

Links can also be drawn between these restrictive policies and the high-quality residential environment, the low level of unionization amongst the local workforce, the associated low wages and, in general, the absence of mass-production industry which has allowed small firms to reach the 'critical mass' for profit take-off very easily. However, the current results of past restrictive planning are now putting considerable pressure on those same planning policies.

The list of existing or proposed high-tech developments is a long one. In early 1985 the City Planner estimated that over 300 000 sq. ft of high-tech and R&D accommodation was in the pipeline (*Chartered Surveyor Weekly* 21 February 1985). For example, opposite the CSP, Pine Developments have built the first phase of the 20-acre Cambridge Business Park. The old Chivers factory site at Histon is being refurbished as 'Vision Park'. The Melbourne Science Park is being extended. Castle Park, on seven acres adjoining the county council offices, comprises high-tech units as well as new council offices. The former Cambridge City football ground is being developed with 170 000 sq. ft of R&D facilities. Aside from these larger schemes, there are many smaller developments including even, for example, conversion of rural pigsties to high-tech units.

With central government encouragement in the form of DoE Circular 16/84 (DoE 1984a), the county and city have been strongly in favour of these trends. South Cambs. District Council, following

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its early involvement in the CSP, has been less enthusiastic, seeking to preserve the local environment even from this prestige form of development, and to maintain more general restraint. For example, on a 22-acre site opposite the CSP, St John's College proposed another science park, the Innovation Centre. The site covered South Cambs. District and Cambridge City territory and, like the CSP site, had been proposed for inclusion in the Green Belt. The City Council was happy to support the proposal but South Cambs. District Council resisted it and won an appeal, thus restricting development to seven acres away from the A10 frontage. However, in another example of the successful use of regulative planning, South Cambs. achieved the landscaping of this undeveloped portion in exchange for allowing car parking on a small part. Another example is the Camtech proposal for a 55-acre science park in the Green Belt near the CSP, which was rejected by South Cambs. District Council. This resulted in a revised proposal, including retailing, a park-and-ride facility and a greatly reduced R&D element.

The growth in the local economy has had repercussions outside the high-tech sector, on the housing, office and retail markets. Segal, Quince and Partners' report comments on the local housing market as follows:

The housing market, both in the city and the surrounding villages, is under pressure; and the shortages are probably most evident in precisely those categories likely to appeal to professional and middle-senior management. (1985, p. 90)

To deal with this, current strategic planning policies aim to allow limited housebuilding for these professional and managerial categories. In particular, they are attempting to steer at least part of the required development into a new village. In doing so they are in fact following market trends, which seek to provide a high-quality environment for up-market housing in separate settlements rather than by extending existing ones. In response to this structure plan policy, private developers have proposed a number of new settlements of their own.

Crow Green is a new village of 4000-5000 dwellings at Papworth Everard. It is being promoted by the Nationwide Building Society, on the basis of the new land ownership and development powers that building societies have acquired. Scotland Park at Hardwick is being put forward by Trinity and Churchill Colleges as a self-contained community of 2200 low-density dwellings with a high-tech/office park. Recently, Waterfenton has been proposed along the A10 to the north of the city. The developers, the Erostin Group, plan to

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build 3000 dwellings together with high-tech development, leisure facilities, a country park and an hotel. Consortium Developments have also announced their interest in developing a similar new settlement along the A10. These and other similar proposals are currently receiving a strong impetus from the land supply side as over-capitalized farmers consider the sale of land following changed European Community agricultural policies.

Restraint policies applied to office development are also being stretched as support services for the high-tech sector spring up: accountancy, merchant banking and public relations. In mid-1985 almost 250 000 sq. ft of offices were under construction (*Chartered Surveyor Weekly* 21 February 1985). The City Council routinely apply local user conditions to office developments. However, this has not prevented speculative office development nor the movement of large firms into Cambridge from outside, as intended. A firm can establish a small branch office to become a local user and then apply for a much larger office development. Local office users can obtain planning permission for new development, vacating their old premises which then, having an existing office use, can be speculatively redeveloped or refurbished.

Yet another sector of the market is also threatening the local regulative planning style with the buoyancy of demand, and that is the retail sector. Currently, retail planning is focusing on how to deal with pressures for out-of-town shopping. Given that the county estimates that out-of-town retailing will be required in Cambridgeshire by 1990, there are voices within the City Council which would favour a hypermarket within the city boundary. It could then be controlled by the City Council to some extent and the impact on the city centre mitigated. For this reason there is a possibility that favourable consideration will be given to a proposal by the major retailers Marks & Spencer and Tesco, for a 250 000 sq. ft out-of-town shopping, hotel and leisure complex at Trumpington, a village south of Cambridge but just within the city boundary. Here the developers are offering planning gain: a park-and-ride scheme from the site to the city centre, which would alleviate some of the city's traffic problems; recreational facilities such as a multiscreen cinema; and payment for part of the Southern Relief Road.

The regulative planning style

The operation of regulative planning in Cambridge has provided an opportunity to examine this style in the context of a buoyant local economy. The Cambridge Phenomenon has both provided the

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development interest necessary for effective regulative planning and threatened to overwhelm local planning policy with the strength of that interest. It is now possible to consider regulative planning as an operating planning style in terms of the institutional arrangements, the politics and decision-making, and the resulting conflicts and tensions.

Institutional arrangements

Regulative planning presupposes a firm policy basis for development control, including consistent written policies and, preferably, a mapping of development allocations. This cannot be provided within one local authority on its own. Rather, it is provided through a network of local authorities. In small part this is due to the need of local authorities to co-operate, or at least to consult with each other over policies for adjoining geographical areas. But in the main the pattern of relations between local authorities in regulative planning derives from the joint effect of the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 and local government reorganization. The former created a dual system of structure and local plans originally intended for unitary authorities; the latter created a two-tier system of local government. As other commentators have noted, the result has been a succession of conflicts between county and district councils over planning powers. More recently, the attitude of central government (evidenced in the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 and the 1986 DoE Green Paper on development plans) has encouraged districts to seek a more dominant position in local planning.

Even though there is an underlying consensus in the Cambridge area over the need for restraint policies and strong regulative planning, there have been cases of conflict over specific policy issues and development proposals. In the early 1960s, when the pressures for further growth were becoming evident, the County Council and a local farmer initiated a proposal to build a private-sector new settlement for some 5000 people at Bar Hill just outside Cambridge. The City Council opposed the proposal on the grounds that the village was too close to Cambridge, adding to the congestion in the city centre but, since it was outside the city boundary, contributing nothing to the city rate fund (Parry Lewis 1974). In the event the proposal was approved in 1964 following an appeal, since when a chequered history of housebuilding has meant that the development is only just being completed after almost 20 years of construction (Potter 1986).

The structure plan review has generated similar conflict over the location of further growth. It was originally proposed that two new settlements should be designated. Although there was agreement

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over the concept of new settlements and over the use of the structure plan as a vehicle for their identification, there was disagreement over the appropriate location. South Cambs. District Council objected to the original two settlements, which were both in this area. Following the downward revision of dwelling numbers, one settlement in East Cambs. District is now proposed. Debate over its location continues.

As has occurred elsewhere, designating Green Belt boundaries has also been a source of conflict between the county and districts. In 1957 the minister approved a Green Belt sketch plan based on the principles of the Holford Wright plan. The review of the development plan redrew the boundaries. Town Map 1, covering the city and hence the inner boundary, was approved in 1965. Town Map 2, covering the outer boundary, was never approved, as it was overtaken, first by local government reorganization and then by a study of the Cambridge sub-area. It therefore forms a 'material consideration' in development control decisions but cannot constitute a statutory Green Belt. The structure plan incorporated the principle of a Green Belt but, given the nature of any Key Diagram, its precise location was left unclear. The Secretary of State's modifications had, in any case, limited the width of the Green Belt to 3-5 miles, rather than approving the extension southwards to the Hertfordshire boundary.

Therefore, in 1981, the County Council prepared a Green Belt subject plan. As elsewhere, this generated conflict over whether district councils or the County Council had the planning responsibility for such detailed mapping of the Green Belt (Elson 1986, Rydin 1986). The plan was published in May 1984, a public local inquiry was duly held in 1985, and the Inspector proposed some 50 amendments. The various district councils were not satisfied with these amendments, but it appears that most councillors in all authorities would have accepted the Inspector's report on the basis of everyone being somewhat disadvantaged. However, the relevant county committee meeting that considered the report decided to proceed on a site-by-site, amendment-by-amendment basis rather than discuss the report as a package. Given their local responsibilities, this encouraged local councillors to resist each and every amendment that reduced the Green Belt. It was decided not to accept the Inspector's report. The various district councils then reverted to their original objections to the plan itself. It thus became impossible for the county to adopt the subject plan prior to the structure plan review as they wished.

As in other counties, the subject plan is now left 'on the table'. Within the city the statutory Green Belt is that defined in the 1965 Town Map 1 and the Newnham/West Cambridge district plan. The statutory inner boundary is therefore more tightly drawn around the

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town than would have been the case if the subject plan had been accepted. This explains the City Council's willingness occasionally to give planning permission on certain Green Belt sites. In South Cambs. District the only statutorily approved Green Belt outer boundary is in the 1957 sketch plan, a document which unfortunately has been lost. Thus Green Belt policy has, to some extent, to evolve *de facto*, through development control decisions which make use of the non-statutory subject plan.

The involvement of a network of organizations can sometimes frustrate the preparation of a sound policy basis. Delay in preparation can create the possibility of policy being overtaken by events, e.g. where central government steps in on appeal and takes a decision over the local authorities' heads. The inherent conflict can also lead to serious policy confusion. For example, one debate over residential allocations in the structure plan review has concerned a 900 dwelling site known as Clay Farm, to the south of Cambridge. South Cambs. District Council favour its release, as does the City. The County Council steering group dealing with the structure plan review made explicit mention of Clay Farm as a proposed housing allocation. The Planning Subcommittee, however, while debating the Green Belt subject plan, for a time proposed putting Clay Farm back into the Green Belt!

Some argue that the difficulties of preparing a clear, up-to-date policy basis for everyday planning decision-making are compounded by the absence of clear regional guidance emanating from central government (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986). Currently central government imposes its view on regional growth in an *ad hoc* manner through structure plan modifications and even appeal decisions. Local authorities therefore have to anticipate the likely reaction of central government to their policy, particularly a restrictive policy. Their discussions reflect not only local preferences but an attempt to forestall possibly higher levels of growth imposed by central government. In order to maintain local control over growth, concessions are made to a perceived central government viewpoint at plan preparation stage. Such a situation may well accentuate the scope for disagreement at the local level, as compared with an attempt to implement a settled regional policy. Against this can be set the view that adding a regional plan to the current hierarchy of plans would extend the bureaucracy of plan making and hence exacerbate the scope for inter-organizational conflict, delays in plan preparation and confusion of current planning policy in an area.

An attempt to cut through these organizational tangles was made by the Nuffield Commission of Inquiry into town and country planning. This proposed the issue of National Planning Guidelines

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and an annual White Paper on Land and the Environment by the DoE. Regional versions of the planning guidelines would also be issued. The county and district councils would prepare their policy documents within this framework. District and local plans would follow current planning practice, but the county strategy would be less extensive than current structure plans while the county development plan would be more detailed (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986). This well developed set of proposals contrasts with the DoE Green Paper of the same year on *The future of development plans*, which suggested the abolition of structure plans and their replacement by district-wide local plans. These government proposals have been temporarily shelved owing to the weight of the legislative programme for the current Parliamentary session.

Politics and decision-making

The formulation of planning policy does not only have to cope with inter-organizational conflict. There are tensions within the local authorities between the various key actors, namely the local politicians and professional planners. These are of two kinds: party political conflict between councillors, and conflict between planners and councillors. The political tensions are highlighted in the Cambridge area by the composition of the various councils.

In May 1981 the County Council became a hung council. Following the last county council elections in 1985, there were 29 Conservative, 26 Alliance, 21 Labour members and one independent member. This is reflected in the Planning Subcommittee as in other committees of the council. The structure plan steering group has equal representation of the main parties among its nine members. The implications of the precise balance of a hung council were appreciated in that the structure plan review was delayed until after the May 1985 elections.

The main party political conflict in planning comes over the scale of growth to be accommodated, with a part of the Conservative grouping vigorously resisting even the modest planned growth proposed in the review. This led to an attempt by the Conservatives to prevent the adoption of the draft review document, first by a series of wrecking amendments and then by a partial walkout at a council meeting. In effect the other two parties are mediating a basic conflict between pro-growth central government Conservatives and anti-growth local Conservatives.

Planning policy itself is developed by the small steering group with planning officer support and advice. The relationship between councillors and planners in this task is quite a complex one. On the one hand, planners have the authority of professional expertise.

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They act as a channel for central government advice, in this case stressing the importance to the national economy of encouraging the Cambridge Phenomenon. In smaller and closed meetings, such as the structure plan steering group, they can speak more freely than in open council and, by initiating particular sessions with invited delegates, they can lead policy debate.

On the other hand, during internal reorganization the structure planning unit has been reduced from over 20 staff working on the first plan to only four working on the review (compared with the nine councillors who were meeting fortnightly during the first year of the review). Furthermore, there is a high level of planning expertise on the steering group, since many of its members were involved in the preparation of the first plan. There is, therefore, also scope for politicians to lead professionals (Healey 1983, pp. 53-5).

Turning towards internal decision-making in the two districts, consideration of development control as well as more strategic policy matters is involved. Until local government reorganization, the City Council was controlled by the Conservatives and the University held eight seats. The election in 1973, on the new boundaries, gave Labour power for three years, but 1976-9 saw the Conservatives again forming the largest group. Since 1980 Labour have been able to take their place. In May 1986 they (just) gained overall control of the council, only to lose it in May 1987. The City Council operates with an Environment Committee and a Development Control Subcommittee of only seven councillors. As is commonly cited elsewhere, planning is not regarded as the most party political committee (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986). Nevertheless, conflicts do sometimes divide along party lines, and there is perhaps an increasing tendency for party politics to intervene in decision-making.

The City Council Conservatives describe themselves as more pragmatic, with a greater understanding of developers' priorities and of the need for development. Yet they strongly support the Green Belt with its implications for reduced development levels. They are also less enthusiastic about the use of enforcement powers, particularly on small businesses. The Alliance and Labour councillors are fairly similar in planning attitudes, which is not surprising given the fact that many Alliance councillors used to be Labour supporters. This involves a less sympathetic attitude towards developers where development in principle has been accepted and, paradoxically, a more permissive attitude to growth *per se* given a concern with local employment prospects.

These views are given expression in discussion of general policy for the city area, in examination of Green Belt boundaries and,

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above all, in development control. Here the party political conflicts are supplemented by other tensions. First, the party political stance of a councillor may conflict with the local responsibility of the councillor as ward representative, a particular problem for councillors on the planning committees. Secondly, the city councillors have developed a very active role in development control, and disagreements between planners and councillors are not infrequent.

Some of these disagreements concern the basis of development control decisions. Planners emphasize the limited land-use planning considerations that legally must underlie each decision, but councillors may wish to take broader issues into account (Loughlin 1980). Sometimes the disagreement is more fundamental, and councillors may overturn the planners' recommendations, usually in order to refuse the application. Councillors generally resent being pressurized by planning officers, as they see it, into accepting the implications of negotiation by officers on applications, perhaps in the form of a Section 52 agreement. On occasion, councillors may press for the preparation of a detailed policy statement when the planners already feel under pressure from a lack of resources. In short, the city planning councillors energetically seek to establish their own planning decisions and priorities, sometimes in the face of contrary professional advice.

In South Cambs. District Council, by contrast, party politics are played down to the point where only a minority of councillors are elected on a party platform at all. Instead, the majority are independent councillors. This means that when planning matters, policy and applications, are discussed by the 20 members of the Planning Committee, local issues very much predominate. The local councillor is always invited to speak first on any matter relating to his/her ward and, by and large, favourable consideration is given to these local views as well as any from the parish council. The members are generally very protective of the environment, keen to maintain the agricultural basis of the district and generally conservative in planning terms.

Although there is often extensive discussion of aesthetic aspects of an application, perhaps following on from the recommendation of the local Architects' Panel, there appears to be less attempt to broaden the basis of planning decision-making. Disagreements with planners seem rarer than in the City Council, with councillors more readily deferring to professional opinion. This may be due to the absence of any strong party line to oppose the professional viewpoint. Yet in cases where there is strong local opposition, it can still be difficult to implement a planner-led strategy, given the committee's commitment to local views.

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These differences, along with less frequent use of enforcement action, follow from the more restrictive policy adopted by South Cambs. District Council. By and large, development is discouraged. Giving any possible precedent for future development permissions is strongly resisted. Even specific land allocations in district plans are viewed warily by some, on the basis that they get taken up so rapidly. An up-to-date structure plan is seen as a firm basis on which to exercise restrictive planning. In this view councillors and planners seem agreed, so that planners can routinely lead decision-making. This situation may change as the agricultural interests within the council shift from a protectionist strategy to an attempt to release land from agricultural use in a changed Common Agricultural Policy context.

In the city, however, the councillors wish to use planning as a tool for directing and influencing development in pursuit of broader social goals. In doing so they often try to expand the remit of statutory planning and hence come into conflict with planners. Professional planning ideology is not always aligned with local attitudes to development, and decision-making occurs through more active discussion between planners and councillors.

In each case though, and including the county, it is an élite of planners with councillors that undertakes the role of decision-making. Together they seek to execute the various procedures of strategic plan-making and detailed development control. Decision-making involves councillors making judgments on party political grounds and out of concern for their particular ward. But, as we have emphasized, it also involves considerable discretion and the exercise of judgment, from skilled and knowledgeable councillors as well as planners. Both councillors and planners use the procedures creatively and stretch them to their legal limit in an attempt to achieve social goals. We therefore characterize this mode of decision-making as technical-political.

Conflicts and tensions: coping with the Cambridge phenomenon

The Cambridge Phenomenon would seem to be an unmitigated success story of the marriage of strong market demand with regulative planning powers. But some of the local implications of the high-tech boom are causing a rethink, particularly within the City Council. The first of these concerns the impact on the local labour market, or rather the lack of impact. About 17% of employment in the sub-area, some 14 000 people, is accounted for by high-tech companies. But the majority of this is highly skilled employment, often filled by in-migrating workers. Even within the high-tech

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sector there is some replacement of skilled staff by lower-cost research students.

The scope for reducing local unemployment amongst semi-skilled and unskilled workers lies not in high-tech industry itself but in any multiplier effects. Currently, only 20% of the local workforce are employed in manufacturing. Closure of the Pye television works, following their takeover by Philips, has further reduced local manufacturing employment opportunities. There is also a tendency for production spin-offs from high-tech companies to be located elsewhere, often outside the UK.

The City Council is extremely concerned about this and about the low level of wages that have persisted in the city despite the boom. It has a vigorous policy of industrial development and has promoted a number of industrial estates such as the 13-acre Clifton Road Estate, developed in partnership with Dencora Securities, and nursery units at various locations in the City. In the three-year period to mid-1985, the City was able to arrange accommodation for 188 industrial firms. But the role of these industrial estates is being affected as high-tech firms locate there. This has occurred on the Clifton Road Estate with the development of the 34 000 sq.ft Camtech Centre, operating with no local user conditions and only one-third site coverage.

Some bodies, such as the local Communist Party (1979) and the Cambridge and District Trades Council (1976), would favour broader encouragement of industry. But within the constraints of current policy, finding a site for, say, a large incoming industrial user would be difficult. The current policy is the only politically feasible one, but it is acknowledged that its impact is likely to be limited.

Related to the relative shift in employment structure is a massive appreciation in local housing values. The effects of the Cambridge Phenomenon are here augmented by the growth in commuting to London from the city. This clearly reduces the ability of local workers outside the high-tech sector to purchase housing and it is even creating problems for key high-tech personnel seeking to move to the area, as Segal, Quince and Partners noted. Restrictive planning policies help to maintain house prices but their relaxation is unlikely to contribute to a fall given the reluctance of housebuilders to cut selling prices; building rates are more likely to adjust downwards in such circumstances. However, as long as housebuilding is profitable at these price levels, the restraint policies will come under attack.

This poses a dilemma for planners. Do they risk stifling the Cambridge Phenomenon if they do not allow more housebuilding, particularly for professional and middle-senior management? Or will more development itself affect the phenomenon by reducing the

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environmental quality of the area? The current approach adopted by the local councils is to control the scale of new development and to guide part of it to a new village, in line with market preference. But past experience shows that planning targets for population growth can be breached by a buoyant development sector and the prospect of central government stepping in to ease the restraint policy remains.

Local policies for retail development may also be threatened by pressure from the private sector. At the time of writing, three appeals for retail schemes north of Cambridge were under consideration. If these appeals are allowed then development proposals will lead structure planning, not vice versa. Similarly, the debate over the Marks & Spencer/Tesco development at Trumpington is an example of development pressure producing specific proposals, and development control decisions on those proposals leading strategic planning. Here the City Council may give approval to a development which is within the Green Belt in order to control the details through regulative planning powers. If it does so the structure plan review will have to accommodate such a scheme and adjust accordingly.

In general, regulative planning is much more successful in dealing with individual schemes than in implementing a strategic policy given the unanticipated impacts of development, the insistent nature of strong market demand and the limited powers of development control. In the end the exercise of regulative planning depends on private sector demand and thus the style essentially requires a mixture of simultaneously encouraging and discouraging development proposals from the private sector. It must be recognized that regulative planning has been particularly well supported in Cambridge because of the concerns of the University, a major local landowner and political force. Until 1973 the University automatically had seats on the City and County Councils. Even now it is an important consultee for local planners. Throughout, it has also been able to rely on a degree of central government support for its viewpoint. For much of the postwar period this has meant a restrictive planning policy, although there have been occasional battles over developing particular sites.

However, the pressures for development are now in substantial part coming from the University itself. It has been variously described by interviewees as a 'vigorous entrepreneur' and a 'pirate'. Where such a major landowner and local political influence seeks development then regulative planning faces great difficulties. For while regulative planning does provide some potential for using market pressures to meet social goals, it can also be used as a mechanism for maintaining property values and selectively releasing the development potential

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of sites. At the moment local regulative planning in Cambridge is maintained by the general agreement on the need for controlling the excesses of strong development pressure. But the underlying tension within regulative planning remains. This is derived from the attempts by various participants to achieve different goals. The difference between the University's and the city and district councils' views of regulative planning is becoming more and more apparent as the high-tech boom continues.

Planning is dead: long live planning! Battered and dispirited in the turbulence of political culture in the 1970s and early 1980s, planning is re-emerging with vigour and purpose in a substantially remodelled form to stimulate and support market processes, rather than to regulate and contain them. This timely book attempts to chart the redirection of planning in the 1980s, providing a framework for understanding its recent history and illuminating the scene with six in-depth case studies of significant and controversial local planning issues.

Remaking planning challenges the common misconception that planning under the Thatcher governments has simply been abandoned to market forces. On the contrary, the authors show that the interrelation of state and market is central to all current styles of planning. Market-led styles of planning are becoming increasingly dominant, while public-sector and community-based planning styles are more and more marginalized.

The case studies are presented as interesting and informative histories, with a comparative analysis of their key features. They range from contrasting approaches to handling intense growth pressures in Cambridge and Colchester, through successful community-based planning on London's South Bank, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project and the pioneering takeover of a large run-down council estate by a private trust in Knowsley, to the multi-billion pound market-driven renewal of London's docklands.

All students, researchers and practitioners of planning will find this book highly relevant to their interests. Those involved with the politics of planning—as professionals, activists or the concerned lay-public—will find in this book an authoritative and accessible account of the contemporary planning scene.

Tim Brindley, Yvonne Rydin and Gerry Stoker began writing this book when they were together at Leicester Polytechnic. Tim Brindley remains at Leicester Polytechnic as Senior Lecturer in Urban Studies in the School of Architecture; Yvonne Rydin is now Reader in the Department of Estate Management at North-East London Polytechnic; Gerry Stoker is Lecturer at the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham.

Cover illustrations (clockwise)

Cambridge Science Park (Yvonne Rydin) Pigs fly above Coin Street (Robert Cowan/Shelter) Culver Precinct (Yvonne Rydin) Derelict tenements, Glasgow (Scottish Development Agency) South Quay Plaza (John Donat/Seifert Group) Stockbridge Village (Denis Thorpe/The Guardian)

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